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Discrimination in the- Coverage of
Retirement Plans
Under the Internal Revenue Code, retirement plans with qualified
status generate substantial tax benefits for employees and employers
alike.' Of the many sections that determine qualifidation, section
410(b)(1) addresses inequalities in the coverage of retirement plans.
To limit disparities in coverage based on income, the section requires
that coverage not "be discriminatory in favor of . . . officers, share-
holders, or highly compensated [employees]."1
2
In assessing whether retirement plans violate this section, govern-
ment officials often apply vague tests that have been the source of
considerable expense to employers and the government itself. The
tests employ rough, indirect measures of inequality and hence can-
not fully serve the purpose of the section. This Note proposes a clear
measure of inequality with intuitive appeal, the Gini coefficient,
which would form the basis of a new test. Under such a test, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) would reject any plan whose Gini co-
efficient exceeded a predetermined maximum. The test would thus
set clear limits on income-related discrimination in coverage. With
minor adjustments, the test could also limit other forms of inequality
that occur in retirement plans, such as discrimination in vesting.
I. Current Methods of Preventing Discriminatory Coverage
By enacting the predecessor to section 410(b)(1), Congress sought
to extend the coverage of retirement plans to all classes of taxpaying
workers, in roughly equal proportions. Responding to other concerns,
however, Congress permitted some deviation from such a broadly egal-
itarian extension of coverage. The IRS was assigned the responsi-
1. The value of tax benefits generated by all qualified plans was $11.335 billion in
1979, $9.940 billion in 1978, and is estimated to be $12.925 billion in 1980. B. BrrrKER
& L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 32 (5th ed. 1980).
2. I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(B).
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bility of determining how much deviation was excessive,$ but has per-
formed this task without great success.
A. Favorable Tax Treatment for Nondiscriminatory Coverage
For some time, the Internal Revenue Code has granted certain tax
benefits to those retirement plans with qualified status.4 If a plan
is qualified, the employer sponsoring it can deduct contributions to
it as a business expense." Participating employees can exclude from
their taxable income the employer's contributions and the earnings
on the plan's assets, until those sums are actually distributed to the
employees.6 At the death of an employee, payments to beneficiaries
out of the employer's contributions can be excluded from the de-
cedent's gross estate and thus are not subject to estate taxes.7
Before 1942, a plan could qualify for these tax advantages if it
was established for the exclusive benefit of "some or all of the [com-
pany's] employees." s As a result, a few highly paid employees of a
company, by creating a plan that covered only themselves, could de-
fer considerable amounts of taxable income for long periods of time.
As early as 1937, the Treasury Department argued forcefully that
the benefit of deferral should not be appropriated solely by the highly
paid, but rather should be extended to workers at many levels of
income.9
3. Id. (Secretary of Treasury is charged with determining whether plan is discrimina-
tory).
4. One commentator on pension plans has described qualified status as being "highly
prized and earnestly sought." D. McGiLL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRivATE PENSIONs 25 (3d ed.
1975). In 1921, Congress enacted legislation that for the first time gave favorable tax
treatment to certain employees' trusts. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 219(f), 42 Stat.
227 (current version at I.R.C. §§ 401-404, 501) (trust created by employer as part of
stock bonus or profit-sharing plan for exclusive benefit of some or all employees is not
taxable; distributions from trust are taxable at time distributed). The Act did not mention
pension plans or pension trusts, but in 1926 Congress made § 219(f) explicitly applicable
to them. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 219(f), 44 Stat. 33 (current version at I.R.C.
§§ 401.404, 501).
5. I.R.C. § 404(a).
6. Id. § 402(a)(1) (amount actually distributed or made available to employee is
taxable to employee in year distributed). Earnings on the plan's assets are not taxable to
the plan either. Id. § 501(a) (organization described in I.R.C. § 401(a)-that is, quali-
fied retirement plan-is exempt from taxation).
7. Id. § 2039(c).
8. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 219(f), 42 Stat. 227 (current version at I.R.C. §§ 401-
404, 501). The Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 165, 45 Stat. 791 (current version at I.R.C.
§§ 401.404, 501) adopted this section without change.
9. In a letter to Congress dated May 29, 1937, the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry
Morgenthau, Jr., stated:
For 10 years the revenue acts have sought to encourage pension trusts for aged
employees by providing corporations with a special deduction on account of con-
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In 1942, Congress came to share the Department's concern.' 0 In-
come tax rates and the number of wage earners paying income tax
had increased sharply." Workers in many income brackets could
therefore legitimately insist on an opportunity to defer taxable in-
come through retirement plans. In response, Congress enacted the
forerunner of section 410(b)(1), section 165(a)(3) of the 1939 Code, to
"insure that stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing plans are operated
for the welfare of employees in general, and to prevent the trust de-
vice from being used for the benefit of shareholders, officials, or high-
ly paid employees."'-' To give substance to those goals, section 165(a)(3)
provided that a plan would not receive qualified status if the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue judged the plan's coverage to be dis-
criminatory.' 3 Through these legislative actions, Congress sought to
extend coverage to all classes of taxpaying workers.
Broadening the coverage of private retirement plans served an ad-
ditional purpose. In 1935, Congress created the social security sys-
tem to "insure not merely subsistence but some of the comforts of
life" for a broad range of retiring employees.' 4 Unfortunately, through-
tributions thereto and exempting the trust itself from tax. Recently this exemption
has been twisted into a means of tax avoidance by the creation of pension trusts
which include as beneficiaries only small groups of officers and directors who are
in the high-income brackets. In this fashion high-salaried officers seek to provide
themselves with generous retiring allowances ....
81 CoNG. REc. 5125 (1937). Introducing Secretary Morgenthau's letter in the Congres-
sional Record, President Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote: "We face a challenge to the
power of the Government to collect uniformly, fairly, and without discrimination taxes
based on statutes adopted by the Congress." Id. at 5124.
In 1942, the Secretary of the Treasury's Special Tax Adviser, Randolph E. Paul, testi-
fied before the House Committee on Ways and Means. He proposed that pension trusts
should not be exempted from tax unless they covered either 70% of all full-time, non-
seasonal employees or a group of employees qualifying under a classification found to
be nondiscriminatory by the Commissioner. Revenue Revision of 1942: Hearings Before
the House Comm. on Ways and Means (pt. 1), 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 87 (1942).
10. See N. TuRE, THE FuTuRE OF PRIVATE PENsION PLANS 34 (1976) (discrimination
against wage employees created legislative concern).
11. Id. ("[I]ncome tax rates shot up in the early 1940's, ... [w]ith a vastly larger
number and proportion of wage employees subject to tax ....')
12. H.R. REP. No. 2335, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 103-04 (1942).
13. Under subsection (B), a trust forming part of a stock bonus, pension, or profit-
sharing plan of an employer for the exclusive benefit of his employees was not taxable
if the plan benefited "such employees as qualify under a classification set up by the
employer and found by the Commissioner not to be discriminatory in favor of employees
who are officers, shareholders, persons whose principal duties consist in supervising
the work of other employees, or highly compensated employees .... ." Revenue Act
of 1942, ch. 619, § 162(a), 56 Stat. 798 (adding § 165(a)(3)(B) to Int. Rev. Code of 1939)
(current version at I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(B)).
14. H.R. RaP. No. 615, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1935); see S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 7 (1935) (program's goal should be to provide "something more than merely
reasonable subsistence").
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out its years of operation, the benefits flowing to many recipients un-
der the program have not been sufficient to provide even for sub-
sistence.15 Since the commencement of the program, private retire-
ment plans have been viewed as a supplement that can compensate
for the deficiencies of the social security system.1 To be effective in
this way, however, private retirement plans must provide extensive
coverage for the country's workers.
Unfortunately, the coverage of private plans continues to be limit-
ed. In 1977, private coverage reached only about one-half of the
private work force, and workers with lower incomes tended to re-
ceive less coverage.' 7 In contrast, the social security system covered
nine of every ten people who were at least 65, in almost every class
of income.18 If private plans are to make up for deficiencies in so-
cial security that persist today, they must cover employees in every
class of income.
Although congressional policy has generally sought to include all
income classes in private retirement plans, Congress permits the exc-
clusion of some employees by certain classifications not based on in-
come.19 In its report on section 165(a)(3), the House Ways and Means
15. See M. BERNSTEIN, THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 189-90 (1964) (in early 1960s
social security benefits fell short of adequacy as measured by the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics (B.L.S.) budget; average couple's social security benefits amounted to $1,640 a
year, which was 54% of $3,000 B.L.S. budget line); P. BRINKER, ECONOMIC INSECURITY
AND SOCIAL SECURITY 72-73 (1968) (Old Age Insurance was inadequate from 1940 to 1949);
P. BRINKER & J. KLOS, POVERTY, MANPOWER, AND SOCIAL SECURITY 112, 113 (1976) (low
level of benefits has been a problem since inception of social security program; in recent
years, "[b]enefit amounts alone are still ordinarily not enough to raise many workers
above the poverty level .... If benefits are termed adequate for those above the poverty
level, and inadequate for those below, a substantial social problem still exists involving
3.3 million aged persons."); J. PECHMAN, H. AARON, & M. TAUSSIG, SOCIAL SECURITY: PER-
SPECTIVES FOR REFORM 91 (1968) (in mid-1960s minimum benefit was 42% of poverty
threshold as officially defined by Social Security Administration for single retired worker
and 50% for married couple).
16. See M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 190 (private plans should be used to supple-
ment inadequate social security); D. McGILL, supra note 4, at 135 (social role of private
pension plans is to supplement "the old-age insurance benefits provided under the Social
Security System . . . for a broad segment of the labor force"); Seidman, Concepts of
Balance Between Social Security (OASDI) and Private Pension Benefits, in SOCIAL SECURITY
AND PRIVATE PENSION PLANS 81 (D. McGill ed. 1977) (referring to "the necessity to turn
to private pension plans to supplement inadequate social security payments"). See also
P. BRINKER & J. KLos, supra note 15, at 113 (need for larger pensions became so urgent
that number of labor unions in 1949 and 1950 concentrated on obtaining larger pensions
as their primary issue in bargaining negotiations); Seidman, supra, at 80 (unions nego-
tiated private pension plans not because they considered plans superior to social security
program, but because they found that retirement income paid by social security was
grossly inadequate to meet needs of their members, and were unable to get Congress
to improve social security benefits sufficiently).
17. Seidman, supra note 16, at 79.
18. Id.
19. I.R.C. § 401(a)(5) provides: "A classification shall not be considered discriminatory
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Committee stated that a plan could be confined to the employees of
certain designated departments, to employees who had reached desig-
nated ages or who had been in the company's employment for a
designated number of years, or to clerical or salaried employees as
opposed to employees paid on an hourly basis. 20 The sole require-
ment specified by the Committee was that the classifications not be
discriminatory by income.21
A plan adopting a nonincome classification, however, unavoidably
generates disproportionate coverage for some classes of income. Em-
ployees who have not reached a specified age or who have worked
less than a designated period of time, for example, tend to receive
lower incomes than employees who have met those age or service re-
quirements for coverage.22 A classification based on age or years of
within the meaning of . . . Section 410(b) . . . merely because it is limited to salaried
or clerical employees." In 1942, the Internal Revenue Code had an identical provision.
Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 162(a), 56 Stat. 798 (adding § 165(a)(5) to Int. Rev.
Code of 1939) (current version at I.R.C. § 401(a)(5)). I.R.C. § 410(a) permits certain
classifications based on age or service.
I.R.C. § 401(a)(5) also provides: "A classification shall not be considered discriminatory
within the meaning of . . . Section 410(b) . . . merely because it excludes employees
the whole of whose remuneration constitutes 'wages' under section 3121(a)(1) (relating
to the Federal Insurance Contributions Act) .... " In 1942, the Internal Revenue Code
had a provision that was essentially the same. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 162(a),
56 Stat. 798 (adding § 165(a)(5) to Int. Rev. Code of 1959) (current version at I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(5)). This provision permits companies to exclude workers below the social se-
curity wage limit.
In practice, companies seldom set up such classifications based on income; for if
they do, they must comply with strict requirements, imposed by the IRS, that place a
low ceiling on the benefits that participants may receive. If the plan's benefits are based
on annual compensation averaged over a minimum of five consecutive years, the rate at
which retirement benefits are provided cannot exceed 1% and can apply only to average
compensation in excess of the wage base. If the plan bases an employee's benefits on his
actual compensation from year to year, the rate at which retirement benefits are pro-
vided cannot exceed 1.4% of the employee's compensation in excess of the applicable
wage base. Rev. Rul. 71-446, 1971-2 C.B. 187, 190. To assure a worthwhile benefit for
employees receiving more than the social security wage limit, most companies have chosen
not to set up such a classification by income, regardless of whether the retirement plan
is a pension plan or a profit-sharing plan. See D. McGiLL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE
PENSIONS 191-92 (4th ed. 1979) (pension plans that do not condition coverage on em-
ployee's level of income are "in much more use than the pure excess plan," which does set
up classification by income); id. at 523 ("[W]ith respect to coverage . . . relatively few
profit sharing plans are integrated with social security . . . [meaning] that those em-
ployees earning less than the social security wage base (or some other stipulated amount)
will not be excluded from coverage under the plan.")
20. H.R. REP. No. 2333, sutra note 12, at 103-04. Companies sponsoring retirement
plans often adopt age and service requirements to lower the surrender charges caused
by the high turnover of younger employees with short service. See HASKINS & SELLS, THE
PENSION SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 26 (1964); Buck, Features of Present-Day Plans,
in PENSIONS AND PROFIT SHARING 17 (3d ed. 1964).
21. H.R. REP. No. 2333, sutra note 12, at 103-04.
22. See M. BERNSTEIN, su~ra note 15, at 176-86.
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service is therefore likely to provide less coverage for workers in
lower classes of income.
23
A retirement plan under which no single income class is given a
disproportionate share of the available coverage might be said to pro-
vide "strict equality" in its coverage. Strict equality would ensure
that the plan did not discriminate-that it did not offer special oppor-
tunities to defer income or otherwise provide preferential treatment
to one income class over another. Yet, by allowing certain nonin-
come classifications, Congress intended to permit some deviation from
strict equality in coverage. Congress did not specify how much de-
viation would be permissible, but left that judgment to the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue.
24
B. Enforcement of Congressional Policy
Since 1942, the IRS has developed many tests to determine whether
a plan's inequality in coverage is intolerably high, and uses any num-
ber of them to assess the coverage of a retirement plan. These tests
fall into two categories. The first category consists of tests derived
directly from the statutory phrase "officers, shareholders, or highly
compensated." 25 Under these tests, the IRS chooses a level of income,
which can vary from company to company, and defines those em-
ployees above that level as "highly compensated" and those below it
as "lower paid. 26 The IRS then assesses the plan's coverage by cal-
23. See id.
24. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 162(a), 56 Stat. 798 (adding § 165(a)(3)(B) to Int.
Rev. Code of 1939) (current version at I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(B)). I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(A) (orig-
inally enacted as Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 162(a), 56 Stat. 798, which added §
165(a)(3)(A) to Int. Rev. Code of 1939) does establish a mechanical "safe harbor" test
under which a plan may satisfy the requirement prohibiting discriminatory coverage.
Subsection (A) requires the coverage of 70% of all employees or, in the case of a
contributory plan, 80% of eligible employees if 70% of all employees are eligible. If a
plan does not meet the stringent requirements of subsection (A), it is subject to examina-
tion under subsection (B). See INTERNAL REVENUE SERvICE, TRAINING MANUAL RrTIRE-
MENT PLANS 5-25 (1975). Because of the stringency of subsection (A), a majority of plans
fail to satisfy its requirements and become subject to examination under subsection (B).
See Interview with Attorney practicing in the field of retirement plans, in California
(Nov. 3, 1980) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
25. I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(B). Under the original legislation, a plan also could not dis-
criminate in favor of "persons whose principal duties consist in supervising the work
of other employees." Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 162(a), 56 Stat. 798 (adding §
165(a)(3)(B) to Int. Rev. Code of 1939) (current version at I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(B)). Until
1974, when this phrase was deleted, see Retirement Plan Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-406, § 1011, 88 Stat. 898, tests in the first category often made reference to
"supervisors" or "supervisory personnel."
26. See Rev. Rul. 56-497, 1956-2 C.B. 284, 286 ("The terms 'highly compensated' and
'lower compensated' are relative, and the distinction between them must be based upon
the circumstances of each case."); cf. Treas. Reg. § 1A10(b)-1(d)(1) (1977) (classification
of employee as highly compensated for section 410(b)(1)(B) made on basis of facts and
circumstances of each case, taking into account employee's compensation and compensa-
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culating proportions selected somewhat arbitrarily from a list of several
possibilities: the proportion of participants who are highly compen-
sated; the proportion of participants who are officers or sharehold-
ers; the proportion of participants who are officers, shareholders, or
highly compensated employees; and the proportion of highly com-
pensated employees who are participants. If the chosen proportions
for a given plan are deemed too high, the IRS finds the plan to be
discriminatory.27
"Cross section tests" form the second category. Under these tests,
the IRS constructs a table showing the distributions of plan partici-
pants and of excluded employees, by various income brackets. It
then looks at the number of participants who fall into brackets that
also contain excluded employees. If the number of participants is un-
reasonably small, the IRS finds the plan to be discriminatory. 28 Oc-
tion paid other employees by employer). The courts have approved this method of
defining highly compensated employees. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Pepsi-Cola Niagara
Bottling Corp., 399 F.2d 390, 393 (2d Cir. 1968) ("We cannot say that in thus reading
'highly' as 'more highly' [in Rev. Rul. 56-497, 1956-2 C.B. 284] . . . the Commissioner
went beyond the powers Congress conferred upon him. .. .'
27. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-256, 1974-1 C.B. 94, 95 (plan found discriminatory when
"two of the eight participants are officer-shareholders" and "three of the eight partici-
pants are highly compensated"); Rev. Rul. 74-255, 1974-1 C.B. 93, 94 (plan found dis-
criminatory when "four of the seven participants are shareholders'); Rev. Rul. 74-141,
1974-1 C.B. 93, 93 (plan found discriminatory when "[e]ach of the [two] participants owns
50 percent of the outstanding stock of the company'); Rev. Rul. 73-283, 1973-2 C.B.
133, 133-34 (plan found discriminatory when "[all] five [participants] are either officers
or supervisors and four of them are also shareholders" and "all the participants in the
plan are officers, shareholders, or supervisors and are highly compensated'); Rev. Rul.
66-13, 1966-1 C.B. 73, 74 (plan found discriminatory when "[t]he two participants are
officers and supervisors and each is compensated at a substantially higher rate than"
the other employees); Temp. Treas. Reg. § ll410(b)-(l)(d)(2) (1975) (determination of
discrimination in favor of officers, shareholders, or highly compensated employees is
based in part on ratio "of such employees benefited by the plan to all employees bene-
fited by the plan").
28. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-256, 1974-1 C.B. 94, 95; Rev. Rul. 74-255, 1974-1 C.B. 93,
94; Rev. Rul. 70-200, 1970-1 C.B. 101, 101. Revenue Rulings 70-200 and 74-256 illustrate
the cross-section test. Revenue Ruling 70-200 evaluates a plan that clearly passed the test,
while Revenue Ruling 74-256 evaluates a plan that clearly failed. Revenue Ruling 70-
200 offers the following distribution of participants and excluded employees:
Compensation Range Excluded Employees Participants
$25,001 to $30,000 0 4
$20,001 to $25,000 0 0
$15,001 to $20,000 18 7
$12,501 to $15,000 37 8
$10,001 to $12,500 38 12
$ 7,501 to $10,000 11 3
$ 5,001 to $ 7,500 4 5
$2,5o to $5,000 2 1
TOTAL 110 40
The above plan passed: "Twenty-two of the 40 plan participants are officer-shareholders,
shareholder-supervisors, or supervisors (persons in whose favor discrimination is pro-
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casionally, the IRS insists that the plan include employees of lower
and middle income brackets in more than nominal numbers or that
the plan cover employees in all compensation ranges. 29
Generally, the courts have sustained the actions of the IRS. Often
employing the same or similar tests, the courts have approved the
reasoning of the IRS as well.80 Both categories of tests, therefore, have
received judicial ratification.
hibited). However, the compensation of all but 4 of the 40 participants is substantially the
same as that of the excluded hourly-paid employees." Rev. Rul. 70-200, 1970-1 C.B.
101, 101.
Revenue Ruling 74-256 offers the following distributions:
Compensation Range Excluded Employees Participants
Above $25,000 0 2
$20,001 to $25,000 0 1
$15,001 to $20,000 0 0
$12,501 to $15,000 0 2
$10,001 to $12,500 3 0
$ 9,001 to $10,000 16 0
$ 8,001 to $ 9,000 18 0
$ 7,001 to $ 8,000 5 0
$ 6,001 to $ 7,000 9 0
$ 5,001 to $ 6,000 0 0
$ 5,000 and below 4 3
TOTAL 55 8
The plan failed: "Two of the eight participants are officer-shareholders. Three of the
eight participants are highly compensated in relation to the excluded employees ....
[In Rev. Rul. 70-200], unlike this case, the compensation of nearly all the participants
was substantially the same as that of the excluded employees." Rev. Rul. 74-256, 1974-1
C.B. 94, 95. Note that in both Revenue Rulings, the IRS drew from tests in the first
category in addition to those in the second category.
29. For example, in Revenue Ruling 70-200, see note 28 supra, the plan also passed
because the plan "covers employees in all compensation ranges; those in the middle and
lower brackets are covered in more than nominal numbers." Rev. Rul. 70-200, 1970-1
C.B. 101, 101. In Revenue Ruling 74-256, see note 28 supra, the plan also failed because
"the plan does not cover employees in all compensation ranges." Rev. Rul. 74-256, 1974-1
C.B. 94, 95.
30. The courts have approved and used tests in the first category. See, e.g., Container
Servs. Co. v. United States, 478 F.2d 770, 771 (6th Cir. 1973) (court, like Commissioner,
held that profit-sharing plan was discriminatory because "[e]ach year four of the five
eligible employees were either officers or supervisors'); Cornell-Young Co. v. United
States, 469 F.2d 1318, 1324 (5th Cir. 1972) (supporting Commissioner's finding, court held
plan to be discriminatory because "[o]f these 7 [covered by the plan], 6 were either
officers, shareholders, supervisors, or highly paid employees'); John Duguid & Sons v.
United States, 278 F. Supp. 101, 105 (N.D.N.Y. 1967) (court affirmed Commissioner's
finding that plan was discriminatory because all three participants were either owners
or supervisor); Pulver Roofing Co. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1001, 1009-10 (1978) (court,
like Commissioner, found plan discriminatory because in three of four years "at least
75 percent of the plan participants were officers and supervisory employees, and, in
the remaining year, 50 percent of the participants were in those categories"); Babst Servs.,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 131, 138-39 (1976) (Commissioner did not err in finding
discriminatory plan in which three of four employees eligible to participate were highly
compensated employees, officers, or shareholders).
On some occasions, the courts in reviewing the decisions of the IRS have used the
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II. Rationale for a Numerical Test of Discriminatory Coverage
Although they can be used to evaluate the coverage of any retire-
ment plan, these tests suffer from two major difficulties. First, they
are vague, and consequently they generate considerable expense, per-
mit inconsistent decisions, and deter some companies from setting up
retirement plans altogether. Second, the tests do not comprehensively
address inequalities in coverage based on income. A clear measure of
inequality with intuitive appeal-the Gini coefficient, for example-
should therefore form the basis of a new test.
A. Deficiencies in th- Form of Current Tests
The tests currently used by the IRS are vague. The IRS has failed
to promulgate any standards for applying its various tests, and it sel-
dom notifies the plan's sponsors of the tests it intends to use in judg-
ing the plan. This vagueness has a number of disadvantages. The
process of negotiation between the IRS and a company seeking to
qualify its plan tends to be extended, and the costs of negotiation
are generally substantial for both parties.3 1 Because negotiations over
converses of the tests enumerated above, see pp. 822-28 supra: the proportion of lower
paid employees who are participants, the proportion of employees other than officers
and shareholders who are participants, or the proportion of employees other than officers,
shareholders, and the highly paid who are participants. Plans have failed these tests
if their proportions were too low. See, e.g., Loevsky v. Commissioner, 471 F.2d 1178,
1180 (3d Cir. 1973) (plan failed because "[a]ll employees who were members of the
prohibited group [officers, shareholders, and highly compensated employees] were among
those covered" while 5% of other members of work force were included); Pulver Roofing
Co. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1001, 1010 (1978) (plan failed because "in each of the years,
100 percent of petitioner's officers participated in the plan, whereas less than 3 percent of
the other employees were covered in 1970, 1971, and 1973 and approximately 8.5 percent
were covered in 1972").
The courts have also approved and used tests in the second category. See, e.g., Com-
missioner v. Pepsi-Cola Niagara Bottling Corp., 399 F.2d 390, 394 (2d Cir. 1968) (court,
like Commissioner, found discriminatory plan in which all participants received more
income than any of excluded employees); King v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 1313, 1319
(D. Neb. 1974) (sustaining Commissioner, court found discriminatory plan that failed to
cover employees in middle and lower compensation ranges).
31. Small companies incur substantial negotiation costs because of the vagueness of
current tests of discriminatory coverage. For the small business, the cost of hiring a
lawyer and an accountant to present a proposed plan to the IRS is significant. Also
considerable is the cost of appealing to the national office of the IRS from the district
office; such an appeal becomes necessary if negotiations over the vague standards break
down at the district office. The small company incurs an additional cost when a pro-
posed plan is rejected by the IRS and must be revised and resubmitted. Interview with
Paul Jackson, The Wyatt Company, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 3, 1980) (notes on file
with Yale Law journal).
The vagueness of current tests generates significant costs for larger firms as well. A
serious problem arises when a large company acquires a smaller company with no re-
tirement plan or with a plan somewhat different from that of the acquirer. Under section
414, if an acquiring company owns at least an 80% interest in a subsidiary so that a
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vague standards are more likely to break down, the vagueness of the
current tests increases the likelihood of costly litigation. Even before
negotiations begin, lack of certainty can complicate the legal planning
of a company sponsoring a plan.3 2 The considerable expenses that
arise from uncertain standards may deter smaller companies from
setting up retirement plans altogether.33 Finally, because the IRS
annually makes some ten thousand determinations on the qualification
of plans,34 the vagueness of current tests increases the probability that
at least some of its decisions are inconsistent with others.35
In addition, the current tests do not fully implement congressional
policy on inequalities in coverage. All the tests in the first category,
which are concerned explicitly with compensation, divide employees
into only two groups, the highly paid and the lower paid, and are not
sensitive to the coverage of various classes within the lower paid. As
a result, the tests do not measure precisely a plan's deviation from
equality in coverage. A similar problem afflicts the cross-section test.
Although it looks at more classes of income and sometimes requires
that more than nominal numbers of employees be covered in several
income classes, it does not consider the total number of employees
in each of those classes. Hence, the test does not look at the propor-
tion of all employees that a given class contains; it does not consider
"commonly controlled group" is thereby formed, the IRS must evaluate the coverage of
all employees in the parent and the subsidiary together. I.R.C. § 414(b). If the con-
trolled group submits its proposal to the IRS and the proposal is rejected under the
currently vague standards, the cost of revision and resubmission is great. Interview with
Paul Jackson, supra. The legal, actuarial, and administrative costs are great when a
controlled group negotiates with the IRS to meet the tests of discriminatory coverage.
Interview with Attorney practicing in the field of retirement plans, supra note 24.
32. The current tests of discriminatory coverage create significant planning costs for
the controlled group of large and small companies. See note 31 supra. The controlled
group, its actuaries, and its lawyers spend considerable time compiling data on the
coverage of the group's employees and using that data to prepare the group's presenta-
tion to the IRS. Vagueness is responsible for significant costs in preparing the presen-
tation because, under the vague tests, a variety of arguments are available to the con-
trolled group when it makes its application to the IRS. Interview with Attorney practicing
in the field of retirement plans, supra note 24.
33. Interview with Paul Jackson, supra note 3I.
34. M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 15, at 185.
35. The vagueness in the current tests causes the decisions on discriminatory cover-
age to be inconsistent: standards vary considerably from district to district and even
from reviewer to reviewer within a district. Interview with Chester Salkind, The American
Society of Pension Actuaries, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 4, 1980) (notes on file with Yale
Law Journal). Further, plans that in one region pass the tests of discriminatory coverage
might fail in another. Interview with Paul Jackson, supra note 31; Interview with Attor-
ney practicing in the field of retirement plans, in Texas (Nov. 4, 1980) (notes on file
with Yale Law Journal). Some district directors and some local IRS agents are more lax
than others in applying the tests of discriminatory coverage. Interview with Paul Jackson,
supra note 31; Interview with Chester Salkind, supra; Interview with Attorney practicing
in the field of retirement plans, suPra note 24.
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the proportion of all coverage that the class receives; and it does not
determine whether that class has a disproportionate share of the cov-
erage available under the plan.3 6 In failing to measure inequality
in coverage systematically, the tests cannot accurately set a maximum
on the amount of inequality that will be tolerated.
A superior test would remedy these difficulties. Such a test would
measure inequality directly and then place a limit on the inequality
that would be permissible. It would substitute one test for the con-
fusing variety of tests currently in use. Finally, a superior test would
employ a numerical criterion 37-a "brightline" standard, which would
eliminate or significantly reduce many of the costs generated by the
vagueness of current tests.38
B. Proposed Measure of Inequality
One possible basis for a superior test is a measure of inequality
called the "Gini coefficient."39 One of the traditional indices of
economic disparity, 40 the Gini coefficient has been used to measure
36. In addition, because the cross-section test allows the sponsoring company some
discretion in the breakdown of income classes it reports, important infornration about
the inequality of a plan may not be disclosed to the IRS. Question 15K of Form 5300,
the application form for the granting of qualified status, asks the sponsoring company
for information to apply the tests under section 410(b)(l). The question requires only
that "the compensation brackets used must reflect the pay pattern of the employer."
[1980] 1 PENS. & PRoFrr SHARING (P-H) 24,178. Companies can to some extent alter the
breakdown to persuade the IRS that they meet the tests of discriminatory coverage. In-
terview with Attorney practicing in the field of retirement plans, supra note 24.
37. The IRS uses numerical tests to evaluate discrimination in other settings-for
example, in assessing whether a plan's integration with Social Security is discriminatory.
See Rev. Rul. 71-446, 1971-2 C.B. 187, 190.
38. See pp. 825-26 supra. A clear numerical standard would save many of the ad-
ministrative, actuarial, -nd legal costs of planning and negotiation now generated by
the vague tests. Interview with Attorney practicing in the field of retirement plans,
supra note 31; Interview with Attorney practicing in the field of retirement plans, supra
note 35.
A numerical, or "brightline," test would insure that IRS rulings are consistent. See
Note, A Spreading of Receipts Formula for Creating a Capital Gains/Ordinary Income
Brightline: Contract Termination Payments and Business-Versus-Investment Assets, 87
YALE L.J. 729, 754 (1978) ("The advantages of mechanical, brightline tests are well
known: they tend to be uniform in application, yielding a high degree of consistency
across cases and courts ... ."); Interview with Chester Salkind, supra note 35; Interview
with Attorney practicing in the field of retirement plans, supra note 35.
39. The measure has also been called "Gini's Ratio of Concentration," Yntema, Mea-
sures of the Inequality in the Personal Distribution of Wealth or Income, 28 J. AM.
STATI ICAL A. 423, 425 (1933), the "Gini coefficient of inequality," R. ALLEN, INDEX
NumBERs IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 218 (1975), and the "Coefficient of Concentration,"
Conrad, Redistribution Through Government Budgets in the United States, 1950, in
INCOME REDISTRIBUTION AND SOCIAL POLICY 178, 242 (A. Peacock ed. 1954).
40. The Gini coefficient has been in use for at least sixty-five years: the Italian
economist Corrado Gini introduced his measure in 1912. C. GINi, VARIABILITA E MUTA-
NILITA 21-33 (1912).
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inequality in the distribution of income, 4' of consumption,42 and of
wealth.43 It is defined to be one-half the relative mean difference of
people's incomes-that is, one-half the average of the absolute values
of differences between all pairs of income.
44
41. Economists using the Gini coefficient have measured inequality in the distribu-
tion of a nation's income and traced the changes in that inequality over time. See, e.g.,
H. MILLER, INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE UNITED STATES 24-25 (1966) (Gini coefficients
for United States in each year from 1947 to 1960); D. SEERS, THE LEVELLING OF INCOMES
SINCE 1938, at 37-38 (1951) (comparing Gini coefficients for United Kingdom in 1938
and in 1947); Conrad, supra note 39, at 200 (comparing Gini coefficients for United States
in 1938-39 and 1950); Goldsmith, Impact of the Income Tax on Socio-Economic Groups
of Families in the United States, in INCOME AND WEALTH: SERIES X 271 (C. Clark & G.
Stuvel eds. 1964) (comparing Gini coefficients for United States in 1929 and in 1959).
Other economists employing the Gini coefficient have measured inequality in the dis-
tribution of the world's income and have shown how little that inequality has diminished
over time. See Andic & Peacock, The International Distribution of Income, 1949 and
1957, 124 J. ROYAL STATISTICAL SOC'Y (SERIES A) 206, 208 (1961) (comparing Gini coef-
ficients computed on international distribution of income in 1949 and in 1957 and
finding no significant change).
Similarly, economists have used the Gini coefficient to compare income inequality among
different nations or among different states within a nation, at one time. See UNITED
NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, INCOMES IN POSTWAR EUROPE ch. 6, at 15
(1967) (comparing Gini coefficients for United Kingdom, Denmark, West Germany, The
Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and France, during period from 1962 to 1964);
Al-Samarrie & Miller, State Differentials in Income Concentration, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
59, 63 (1967) (Gini coefficients for individual states in United States in 1959).
To measure the effect of taxation and of government expenditure on a nation's in-
equality, analysts have compared Gini coefficients calculated from the distribution of
pre-tax incomes, the distribution of post-tax incomes, and the distribution of post-tax
incomes augmented by the benefits of government expenditures. See, e.g., Conrad, supra
note 39, at 200 (Gini coefficients in United States for pre-tax incomes, post-tax incomes,
and post-tax incomes including government expenditures); Goldsmith, supra, at 271 (com-
paring Gini coefficients on before-tax incomes and after-tax incomes in United States).
Some economists have focused on the inequalities to be found within various occupa.
tional groups. See, e.g., id. at 276 (Gini coefficients calculated on after-tax incomes of
laborers, of service workers, of craftsmen and operatives, of clerical and sales workers, of
farmers and farm managers, of salaried proprietors, professionals, and technical workers,
and of self-employed proprietors, professionals, and technical workers, in United States).
42. Economists using the Gini coefficient have measured inequality in the world's real
consumption and have shown how little that inequality has diminished over time. See
Beckerman & Bacon, The International Distribution of Incomes, in UNFASHIONABLE Eco-
NOMIcs 62-63 (P. Streeten ed. 1970) (comparing Gini coefficients computed on distribution
of world's real consumption in 1954-55 and 1962-63 and finding decline from .570 to .567
to be insignificant).
43. At least one economist has used the Gini coefficient to measure inequality in the
distribution of wealth. See Yntema, supra note 39, at 429 (listing in Column R' (for Gini's
Ratio) Gini coefficients computed on distributions of males' assets in Australia, of fe.
males' assets in Australia, of wealth in United States, of estates in France, of estates in
United Kingdom, of males' estates in Massachusetts, of males' estates in Wisconsin, and
of males' estates in United States).
44. The Gini coefficient can be defined as follows:
n a
G = (1/2n Y) : I jy. - Yj,
i=1 j=I
where n is the number of persons in the population, y1 is the income of person i, yj is
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The Gini coefficient has a number of favorable characteristics that
have been considered important for a measure of inequality. First,
because the coefficient measures the difference between each person
and everyone else in the population, it is a direct measure of income
difference and hence of inequality.45 It is thus able to capture a great
deal of information about the distribution of income. Second, the
Gini coefficient is sensitive to any shift in income between the poor
and the rich; for example, it always registers an increase when in-
come is transferred from a poorer person to a richer person within
the population. 4" Third, the value of the coefficient does not change
even if the units measuring income are changed;47 consequently, the
coefficient can make comparisons between different distributions of
income regardless of the monetary units underlying those distribu-
the income of person j, and y is the mean income. A. SEN, ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 31
(1973); see Dalton, The Measurement of the Inequality of Incomes, 30 ECON. J. 348, 353
(1920); Yntema, suPra note 39, at 425.
45. Sen, an economist, has written that, in general, a good measure of inequality
should gauge the income difference between each person and everyone else. See A. SEN,
sulra note 44, at 28 (recommending comparison between every pair of incomes to "cap-
ture everyone's income difference from everyone else").
The Gini coefficient meets this requirement. See id. at 31 ('Undoubtedly one appeal
of the Gini coefficient . .. lies in the fact that it is a very direct measure of income
difference, taking note of differences between every pair of incomes.') (emphasis in origi-
nal). In contrast, other measures often take the difference between each income level
and the mean, which might represent no particular person's income and which in any
case can act only as a summary statistic for all the incomes in the population. See id.
at 28 (criticizing one measure of inequality that captures difference of each income level
from the mean only, "which might not be anybody's income whatsoever").
46. The economist Hugh Dalton maintains that a successful measure of inequality
should be sensitive to transfers of income between a poorer person and a richer person
within the population. See Dalton, supra note 44, at 351-52 (principle of transfers re-
quires that transfer from richer to poorer diminish measure of inequality).
The Gini coefficient fulfills this requirement. See A. SEN, supra note 44, at 31 (Gini
coefficient does not sacrifice "the quality of being sensitive to transfers from the rich
to the poor at every level'); Dalton, suPra note 44, at 353 (Gini coefficient "is perfectly
sensitive to transfers"). The Gini coefficient can be defined by a formula equivalent to
that stated above, see note 44 supra:
G = 1 + (1/n) - (2/n 2 y) [y, + 2y, +... + ny,],
where y, > Yx > ... > y.
A. SEN, supra note 44, at 31. Since any term in the bracketed expression has a larger
coefficient than a term to its left, a transfer from a poorer person to a richer person
always decreases the bracketed expression. Because the sign in front of the bracketed
expression is negative, the Gini coefficient always increases as a result of such a transfer.
47. The statistician Dwight Yntema states that a successful measure of inequality
should not depend on the particular monetary units used to assess incomes. Yntema,
suPra note 39, at 423 ("An acceptable coefficient must be . . . independent of the unit
in which income, or wealth, is measured.')
The Gini coefficient meets this condition. Id. at 423-25. Suppose, in the formula stated
above, see note 44 supra, the units measuring income are changed so that incomes in-
crease uniformly by the multiple m. Then both the numerator and the denominator
(2nS) increase by the multiple m, and the Gini coefficient remains the same.
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tions. Finally, the Gini coefficient is fairly easy to compute.48 On
account of these attributes, the Gini coefficient has proven to be su-
perior to other measures of inequality.49
The Gini coefficient is often given a graphical definition 0 that
is equivalent to its algebraic definition.51 This graphical definition
can be modified so that the coefficient measures inequality in the
coverage of retirement plans. The figure below illustrates how the
48. A fourth condition for a measure of inequality is that "[t]he numerical value of
a coefficient should not be difficult to compute." Yntema, supra note 39, at 424. The
Gini coefficient satisfies this condition. Id. at 424-25.
49. See Nicholson, Redistribution of Income in the United Kingdom in 1959, 1957,
and 1953, in INCOME AND WEALTH: SERss X 121, 142 (C. Clark & G. Stuvel eds. 1964)
("The best single measure of inequality in the distribution of income is probably the
Gini coefficient.")
None of the measures competing with the Gini coefficient has all four of these char-
acteristics. One competing measure is the relative mean deviation, which compares the
income level of each person in the population with the mean income, sums the absolute
values of all the differences, and divides by the total income of the population. A. SEN,
supra note 44, at 25; see Yntema, supra note 39, at 425. The relative mean deviation is
not very sensitive to shifts in income between rich and poor: it registers no change
whatsoever when a transfer takes place between a poorer person and a richer person
lying on the same side of the mean. See A. SEN, supra note 44, at 26-27.
Another measure, the variance, squares the differences between income levels and the
mean income, sums all the squares, and divides by the total population. Id. at 27. The
variance is sensitive to transfers taking place between all levels of income. Id. Values of
the variance, however, depend upon the particular units that individuals in the popu-
lation use to assess their incomes: by the definition of variance, if the monetary units
are changed and incomes increase uniformly by the multiple m, the value of the vari-
ance increases by m2 .
The coefficient of variations, which is the square root of the variance divided by the
mean income, id., does not depend on the particular units of income chosen by the
population. By this definition, if the monetary units are changed and incomes increase
by the multiple m, the coefficient of variation remains the same. The coefficient fails,
however, to capture the income difference between each person and everyone else; in.
stead, it measures the difference between each income level and the mean. See id. at 28.
The standard deviation of logarithms compares the logarithm of each income level
with the logarithm of the mean, sums the squares of all the differences, divides by the
total population, and takes the square root. Id. at 29; see Yntema, supra note 39, at 426.
The standard deviation of logarithms suffers from two difficulties. First, it is insensitive
to transfers over certain brackets of income. A. SEN, suPra note 44, at 32. Second, by
concentrating solely on differences between the logarithms of income levels and the
mean, the standard deviation of logarithms fails to measure income differences between
each person and everyone else. Id. at 29 (standard deviation of logarithms "shares
with [the variance] and [the coefficient of variation] the limitation of taking differ-
ences only from the mean").
Like the other measures that compete with it, the Gini coefficient satisfies two other
conditions sometimes thought to be important: it is independent of the number of
people in the population, and it has definite limits, 0 for equality and 1 for the greatest
inequality. See Yntema, supra note 39, at 423-24.
50. See A. SEN, supra note 44, at 30. By the graphical definition, the Gini coefficient
is twice the area between a hypothetical line of strict equality and the actual cumulative
distribution of the share of society's total income. See D. PALUmiBO, STATIs'rrcs IN PoLTCAL
AND BEHAVIORAL SCLENCE 31 n.4 (1969).
51. See note 44 supra (stating algebraic definition).
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Gini coefficient could measure discrimination in a hypothetical re-
tirement plan. For every data point, the percentile of employees by
income is the x-coordinate, and the percentage of all the plan's par-
ticipants located in that percentile is the y-coordinate. The set of all
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Figure
The Gini coefficient for the hypothetical plan is defined to be
twice the area between the plan's Lorenz curve and a forty-five de-
gree line. If a plan covered all classes of income proportionally, so
that there was "strict equality" in coverage by income,53 any given
proportion of workers by income would have an equivalent proportion
of the plan's total coverage. The forty-five degree line, which con-
sists of the points (q, q), represents this strict form of equality: along
such a "line of equality," the lowest q percent of the workers enjoy
precisely q percent of the coverage available. The Gini coefficient
52. The statistician, M.O. Lorenz, introduced his curve in 1905. Lorenz, Methods of
Measuring the Concentration of Wealth, 9 PUBLICAcrONs AM. STATIS1TCAL A. 209 (1905).
It is a well-regarded statistical tool. See D. PALUMBO, supra note 50, at 29 ('A particu-
larly useful descriptive device is the Lorenz curve ... ') Palumbo extended the con-
cept of the Lorenz curve to observe inequality in political representation. Id. at 31-32.
53. See p. 822 supra.
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(twice the area between the plan's Lorenz curve and the line of equal-
ity) measures the extent to which the plan's Lorenz curve deviates
from strict equality and is therefore a measure of inequality in
coverage.
III. Development of the Standard for Discriminatory Coverage
Section 410(b)(1) can be interpreted to disqualify a retirement plan
when the plan's deviation from strict equality in coverage is intol-
erably high.5 4 The Gini coefficient is an appealing measure of a plan's
deviation from equality in coverage and therefore could form the
basis of a new test. To construct such a test, the IRS should deter-
mine a value of the Gini coefficient that would represent the maxi-
mum inequality in coverage that would be permitted. In evaluating
a particular plan, the IRS would assemble data on the percentage
of total participants in each decile of income, calculate the Gini co-
efficient for the plan by a simple formula, 55 and approve the plan
only if the coefficient is less than the specified maximum.
To develop an appropriate value for such a maximum, the IRS
might adopt one of two strategies. Under the first, it would decide
which of the agency's determinations, both reported decisions and
54. See pp. 819-22 supra.
55. If the plan's Lorenz curve is generated by data on each decile of income, the
formula for the Gini coefficient turns out to be simply twice the sum of the areas of
ten trapezoids. In the figure, let each of the points on the Lorenz curve be signified by
(xk, Yk), where k = 0, 1, 2 ..... 10, and xk takes on the value 0 when k = 0 and mul-
tiples of ten thereafter. The region between the forty-five degree line (line of equality)
and the Lorenz curve from Xk to Xk., forms a trapezoid whose vertices are (xk, Yk), (Xk, xk),
(Xk+l, Xk+1), and (xkx, Yk..I). The area of the trapezoid is one-half the altitude times the
sum of the bases:
1/2 (xk. - Xk) [(xk - yk) + (Xk+ - ykl)].
The area between the forty-five degree line and the Lorenz curve is the sum of the
areas of all ten trapezoids:
9
9 1/2 (Xk,. - Xk) [(Xk - Yk) + (Xk.1 - Yk+ )].
k=O
The Gini coefficient is defined to be twice the area between the forty-five degree line
and the plan's Lorenz curve, see pp. 830-31 supra.
9
G = y (xk., - xk) [(xk - yk) + (xk+ - yk,.)].
k=O
Data on percentiles of income, rather than deciles, would yield a Gini coefficient that
more accurately measures the plan's inequality in coverage. The formula, however, would
require the summing of the areas of one hundred trapezoids, instead of just ten. Econo-
mists measuring inequality in income have traditionally used data on deciles to calculate
Gini coefficients. See, e.g., UNInTE NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, supra
note 41, ch. 6, at 15; Beckerman & Bacon, supra note 42, at 62.
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private rulings,"e reflect its soundest evaluations. It might, for ex-
ample, choose the decisions issued in certain years or those made by
certain district directors, as being the most exemplary. Alternatively,
the IRS could generate a number of hypothetical plans and, in light
of its experience, make determinations in each case. Then, calculat-
ing the Gini coefficient for each plan in this pool of either actual or
hypothetical examples and noting the disposition in each case, the
IRS could construct one frequency distribution of computed Gini
coefficients for the rejected plans and another for the approved plans.57
The distributions would in all likelihood overlap because the vague-
ness of current tests lends itself to inconsistent decisionmaking. From
the two distributions, the IRS should eliminate the most aberrant of
the inconsistent decisions. To achieve this result, the IRS could con-
sider overlapping cases to be inconsistencies and could strike from
consideration the highest approved plan and the lowest rejected plan,
then the next to the highest approved plan and the next to the lowest
rejected plan, and so on, until the two remaining distributions over-
lapped at only one point. That point would represent the value that
the IRS should adopt for its maximum Gini coefficient.
Under a second and simpler strategy, the IRS could generate a
number of hypothetical plans and calculate the Gini coefficient for
each plan. Then, by noting the value of the Gini coefficient corres-
ponding to each plan in the pool, the IRS could estimate how much
inequality was associated with each value of the Gini coefficient. After
reviewing its ideas about the levels of inequality that are tolerable,
the IRS could then specify a particular value of the Gini coefficient
to be the maximum.
IV. An Extension to Discriminatory Vesting
The new test, developed to limit inequality in coverage, could be
adapted to the related problem of inequality in vesting. The interest
of a participant in a plan is said to have vested when he acquires
the right to receive his accrued benefits at retirement regardless of
whether he is in the employer's service at retirement.58 Section
411(d)(1) of the Code disqualifies a plan if, as a result of the plan's
vesting arrangement, "there have been, or there is reason to believe
there will be, an accrual of benefits or forfeitures tending to dis-
56. The IRS makes determinations on at least 10,000 plans a year. See M. BFxSEraN,
supra note 15, at 185.
57. See Appendix, pp. 836-39 infra.
58. D. McGiLL, supra note 4, at 130.
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criminate in favor of... officers, shareholders, or highly compensated
[employees]." 59
This section ensures that private plans supplement social security
benefits for a broad segment of the labor force and guarantees equi-
table treatment for all participants in a plan.6 0 The Code, however,
does permit a sponsoring company to deny vesting to employees by
age or service requirements,61 which invariably lead to some de-
viation from equality in vesting across all income groups. 2 Section
411(d)(1) should therefore be interpreted as setting a limit on a plan's
deviation from strict equality in vesting rather than requiring strict
equality.63
Under past revenue procedures, the IRS employed a numerical test:
it granted a plan qualified status if the plan had so-called "4/40
vesting."6 4 A plan with 4/40 vesting provides for forty percent vest-
ing after four years of service to the employer (that is, the participant
has a nonforfeitable right to forty percent of the benefits accrued
from employer contributions), forty-five percent vesting after five
years of service, fifty percent vesting after six years, an additional
ten percent vesting for each additional year of service, and full
vesting after eleven years.65
Recently, however, the IRS decided that 4/40 vesting does not fur-
ther the goals of section 411(d)(1).6 6 Under proposed regulations, the
IRS would no longer ensure qualified status for a plan with 4/40
vesting 7 and would institute a test of discrimination that relies on
59. I.R.C. § 411(d)(1)(B).
60. See D. McGix., supra note 4, at 135.
61. Under section 411(a)(2)(A) and section 411(a)(2)(B), classifications based upon years
of service are permitted as long as specified percentages of accrued benefits are nonfor-
feitable after certain corresponding years of service (in section 411(a)(2)(A), 100% must
be nonforfeitable after 10 years; in section 411(a)(2)(B), 25% must be nonforfeitable after
five years, and progressively higher percentages nonforfeitable thereafter, until 100%
is nonforfeitable after 15 years). Under section 411(a)(2)(C), classifications based on ser-
vice and age combined are permissible, if specified percentages of accrued benefits are
nonforfeitable for certain corresponding combinations of age and service. I.R.C. § 411(a)(2).
Plans conforming to section 411(a)(2)(A), (B), or (C) must also fulfill the requirements
of section 411(d)(1).
62. Employees who have not yet attained a specified age or who have worked less
than a designated period of time tend to receive lower incomes than those who have
not. See p. 821 supra.
63. See p. 822 supra.
64. See Rev. Proc. 76-11, 1976-1 C.B. 550, 550 ("[T]he Service shall treat the vesting
schedule of a plan as satisfying the [nondiscrimination] requirements of section 401(a)(4)
of the Code ...[if the plan adopts] 4-40 vesting. ); Rev. Proc. 75-49, 1975-2 C.B.
584, 585-86 (same).
65. Rev. Proc. 75-49, 1975-2 C.B. 584, 585-86.
66. See 45 Fed. Reg. 24,201, 24,201 (1980) ("4/40 vesting did not reflect the policies of
ERISA [the Act containing section 411(d)(1)] if applied as a maximum vesting schedule.")
67. See 45 Fed. Reg. 39,869, 39,870 (1980) (4/40 vesting should not be viewed as safe
harbor).
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the facts and circumstances of each plan. 68 According to this test, a
"reasonable disparity between the vested benefits paid to or accrued
by the prohibited group [that is, the officers, shareholders, and high-
ly compensated employees] and the vested benefits paid to or accrued
by other employees [would] . . .not result in a finding that there
is discriminatory vesting."6 9
Illustrating the proposed test with several examples, 70 the IRS in-
dicated that it would give substance to the test in two ways. First,
the IRS would compare the present value of the prohibited group's
vested benefits with that of other employees' vested benefits. Second,
after constructing a distribution, by income bracket, of employees
who have vested benefits, the IRS would apply a cross-section test simi-
lar to the one it now uses to assess a plan's coverage.
The proposed test is vague 71 and does not address inequality in vest-
ing comprehensively. The general statement of the test and the first
method of implementing it divide employees into only two groups-
the prohibited group and other employees-and thus are not sensitive
to vesting by a variety of income classes. The second method of im-
plementing the test, the cross-section approach, does not consider the
total number of employees within each income class and hence can-
not assess whether any class has a disproportionate share of the vest-
ing available under the plan.72
68. Id. at 39,871 ("The determination of whether there is, or there is reason to be-
lieve there will be, discriminatory vesting shall be made on the basis of the facts and
circumstances of each case.")
69. Id.
70. The first two examples are instructive. In the first example, a plan offers full
vesting after 10 years of service and no vesting before that time. The present value of
the vested benefits for officers and shareholders is less than the present value of the
vested benefits of all other employees. The plan's vesting would not be considered dis-
criminatory. Id. at 39,870.
In the second example, a plan again offers full vesting after 10 years of service and
no vesting before that time. The distribution of vested employees by income meets the
same type of cross-section test as that used to evaluate coverage. The plan's vesting
would not be considered discriminatory. Id.
71. The IRS has failed to promulgate any standards for the general statement of
the test or for either of the two methods of implementing the test. See id. at 39,870-71.
Vagueness in the proposed tests for discrimination in vesting would generate the same
types of costs that were generated by the vagueness of the coverage tests. See pp. 825-26
supra. The proposed tests would result in inconsistent decisions on discriminatory vest-
ing, Interview with Chester Salkind, supra note 35; they would subject small companies
to substantial costs of planning and negotiation, Interview with Paul Jackson, sura
note 31; and they would generate significant planning costs for controlled groups, Inter-
view with Attorney practicing in the field of retirement plans, supra note 24.
72. Like the cross-section test for coverage, the cross-section test for vesting does not
consider the proportion of all vesting that each class receives, and the test does not
compare that proportion with the proportion of all employees that the class contains.
The test, therefore, cannot determine whether any class has a disproportionate share of
the total vesting available under the plan.
The Yale Law Journal
A new test based on the Gini coefficient could measure and limit
inequality in vesting. To evaluate a particular plan, the IRS would
count full vesting as one unit and partial vesting as an appropriate
fraction of one unit. The total vesting available under the plan would
be the sum of the units of vesting of every employee. The IRS would
then assemble data presenting the proportion of total vesting given
to each decile of employees, calculate the Gini coefficient for the
plan, and approve the plan only if its coefficient were less than a
specified maximum.
To determine the value of such a maximum, the IRS could adopt
one of two strategies, similar to those suggested in the setting of
discriminatory coverage. Under the first, the agency would make deci-
sions on the qualification of numerous hypothetical plans, and then
eliminate the aberrations from its two distributions of computed Gini
coefficients until it arrived at an appropriate value for the maximum.
The IRS, however, should not apply this procedure to actual past
rulings: based on the obsolete 4/40 vesting rule, the agency's pre-
vious decisions on discriminatory vesting would be unreliable. Un-
der the second strategy, the IRS would calculate the Gini coefficient
for a number of hypothetical plans, estimate the level of inequality
associated with the computed values of the coefficient, and choose
a particular value of the coefficient to be the maximum.
Conclusion
The proposed test of discriminatory coverage has several advantages
over the tests currently in use. Based on the Gini coefficient, the test
would directly measure and limit inequality in coverage, substitute
a single test for the present multiplicity of tests, and apply a clear
numerical criterion. The proposed test would thus solve many of the
problems besetting the current methods of judging discriminatory cov-
erage. An additional advantage of the test is that, with minor adjust-
ments, it could limit discrimination in a variety of related settings.
APPENDIX
This Appendix illustrates how to calculate the Gini coefficient for each
plan in a particular pool of decisions reported to the public. Of the many
public cases and rulings discussing retirement plans, only a few report the
data needed to compute the Gini coefficient.73 In fact, public cases and
73. The formula for the Gini coefficient, see note 55 supra, requires data on the
distributions of plan participants and excluded employees by income.
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rulings provide the necessary data on exactly fifteen retirement plans.
74
Of these fifteen plans, fourteen were rejected and one was approved.
75
The computed Gini coefficients for the fourteen rejected plans ranged
from a high of .789 to a low of .120, while the Gini coefficient, for the
successful plan was .00758. Table 1 below presents the fifteen plans in
descending order of their Gini coefficients and gives, for each plan, the
Gini coefficient, the final disposition of the plan, and the year of the
disposition.
For purposes of this discussion, the same plan operating in different
years is treated as a set of distinct plans, because each year the same plan
covers a different number of employees in the various income brackets
and is evaluated separately. Hence, in Table 1, Pulver Roofing Co. v.
Commissioner, Parts I, II, III, and IV, represent the same plan operating
in 1970, 1971, 1972, and 1973, respectively.
Table I
Rulings and Cases Gini Coefficients Disposition
I. Pulver Roofing Co. v. Commissioner,
Part I
2. King v. United States
3. Private Letter Rul. 7750008: Part II
4. Pulver Roofing Co. v. Commissioner,
Part II
5. Rev. Rul. 69-398
6. Pulver Roofing Co. v. Commissioner,
Part IV
7. Wisconsin Nipple and Fabricating Corp.
v. Commissioner
8. Commissioner v. Pepsi-Cola Niagara
Bottling Corp.
9. Private Letter Rul. 7750008, Part I
10. Liberty Machine Works, Inc. v.
Commissioner, Part I
11. Pulver Roofing Co. v. Commissioner,
Part III
12. Rev. Rul. 74-256
13. Rev. Rul. 74-255
14. Liberty Machine Works, Inc. v. Commissioner,
Part III
















74. See Wisconsin Nipple & Fabricating Corp. v. Commissioner, 581 F.2d 1235 (7th
Cir. 1978); Commissioner v. Pepsi-Cola Niagara Bottling Corp., 399 F.2d 390 (2d Cir.
1968); King v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 1313 (D. Neb. 1974); Pulver Roofing Co. v.
Commissioner, 70 T.C. 1001 (1978) (containing four plans with sufficient data); Liberty
Mach. Works, Inc. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 621 (1974) (containing two plans with suf-
ficient data); Rev. Rul. 74-256, 1974-1 C.B. 94; Rev. Rul. 74-255, 1974-1 C.B. 93; Rev.
Rul. 70-200, 1970-1 C.B. 101; Rev. Rul. 69-398, 1969-2 C.B. 9; Private Letter Rul. 7750008
(1977) (containing two plans with sufficient data).
75. All of the plans in the cases and rulings listed above, see note 74 supra, were
rejected except the plan in Rev. Rul. 70-200, 1970-1 C.B. 101, which was approved.
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The Yale Law Journal
Revenue Ruling 70-200 contains the plan that was approved, and Lib-
erty Machine Works, Inc. v. Commissioner, Part II, contains the rejected
plan with the lowest Gini coefficient. These important plans can be used
to demonstrate the calculation of the Gini coefficient. The distributions
of participants and excluded employees for the plan in Revenue Ruling
70-200 are presented above.76 The distributions for the plan in Liberty












$ 9,001 to $10,000
$ 8,001 to $ 9,000
$ 7,001 to $ 8,000
$ 6,001 to $ 7,000
$ 5,001 to $ 6,000
$ 4,001 to $ 5,000
$ 3,001 to $ 4,000
$ 2,001 to $ 5,000






















The Gini coefficient for each plan is computed in three steps. The first
step is to determine the percentile that each income bracket of the plan
represents. The second is to calculate the percentage of plan participants

























76. See note 28 sufbra.
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step is to apply the formula for the Gini coefficient
b-I
G = : (Xk+1 - Xk) [(Xk - Yk) + (Xk+l - Yk+1)],
k=0
where b is the number of brackets of income that the sponsoring company
has submitted in its application to the IRS.7S For the plan in Revenue
Ruling 70-200, the result is .007575; for the plan in Liberty Machine Works,
Inc. v. Commissioner, the result is .1199.
78. See note 55 supra (deriving formula).
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